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ON THE INVERSE POWER INDEX PROBLEM
SASCHA KURZ
ABSTRACT. Weighted voting games are frequently used in decision making. Each voter has a weight and a proposal is
accepted if the weight sum of the supporting voters exceeds a quota. One line of research is the efficient computation of
so-called power indices measuring the influence of a voter. We treat the inverse problem: Given an influence vector and
a power index, determine a weighted voting game such that the distribution of influence among the voters is as close as
possible to the given target value. We present exact algorithms and computational results for the Shapley-Shubik and the
(normalized) Banzhaf power index.
1. INTRODUCTION
The European Economic Community, i. e. the predecessor of the European Union, was founded in 1957 by
Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands. Decisions were and are made via polling.
More precisely, each country has a given voting weight, see Table 11, and a proposal is approved if it is supported
by at least 12, called the quota, out of the 17 votes. So Luxembourg possesses 117 of all votes. But let us consider
the following thought experiment: The five countries except Luxembourg vote for their own without asking for
Luxembourg’s opinion. In any case the number s of supporting votes is even. Thus the vote of Luxembourg does
not matter at all. For s ≥ 12 the proposal will be approved and for s ≤ 10 the proposal will be rejected. We may
say that Luxembourg has absolutely no power in this weighted voting game.
state votes population (2010)
Germany 4 82144902
France 4 62582650
Italy 4 60017346
the Netherlands 2 16503473
Belgium 2 10783738
Luxembourg 1 494153
TABLE 1. Voting weights and the quota in the European Economic Community of 1957.
To have a measurement of the relative power of the members of voting schemes in more complex situations,
power indices like the Shapley-Shubik or the Banzhaf power index were invented, see the next section for a defi-
nition. Table 2 lists the values of the two mentioned power indices for three different weighted voting games. We
remark that there is a non-linear dependency between weights, quota and the value of the considered power index.
If we suppose that there exists some agreement on a fair distribution of power (di)1≤i≤n among the n countries
and a selection of an appropriate power index P , we obtain the inverse power index problem2: min ‖d − P(χ)‖,
where χ is a weighted voting game for n voters and ‖ · ‖ an arbitrary suitable norm to measure the deviation, i. e. a
rule to decide which assignment of voting weights is fairer. In practice the intended power distribution d may arise
from the population numbers, either in the variant “One Person, One Vote”, i. e. di is proportional to the population
of country i, or by using Penrose square root law, i. e. di is proportional to the square root of the population of
country i [20, 22].
2000 Mathematics Subject Classification. Primary: 91B12; Secondary: 90B99.
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1Recent estimates for the population are taken from http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu.
2In [11] the authors call this problem the voting game design problem.
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state wi SS BZ wi SS BZ wi SS BZ
Germany 4 0.233 0.238 4 0.233 0.229 4 0.233 0.222
France 4 0.233 0.238 4 0.233 0.229 4 0.233 0.222
Italy 4 0.233 0.238 4 0.233 0.229 4 0.233 0.222
Netherlands 2 0.150 0.143 3 0.200 0.188 2 0.100 0.111
Belgium 2 0.150 0.143 2 0.050 0.063 2 0.100 0.111
Luxembourg 1 0.000 0.000 1 0.050 0.063 1 0.100 0.111
quota 12 12 11
TABLE 2. Power indices for different weighted voting games.
1.1. Related work. There is a vast literature how to compute the Shapley-Shubik index and other power indices
in various circumstances, either exactly or approximatively. Few results are known about the inverse power index
problem so far. Leech proposes a certain kind of fixed point algorithm and reports that it works considerably well
in practice, whenever the number of voters n is not too small [16, 15], see also [14]. The author argues that for
large n one may assume that the power index smoothly depends on the voting weights and thus Brouwer’s fixed
point theorem can be applied to prove the convergence of this approach. Another heuristic is described in [4].
Besides using the finiteness of the set of weighted voting games, the first general bounds stating that some power
distributions can not be approximated by Banzhaf vectors too closely are given by Alon and Edelman [1].
Since for each number of voters n there is only a finite set of weighted voting games one may simply solve the
inverse power index problem by looping over the whole set. The enumeration of weighted voting games dates back
to at least 1962 [18], where up to 6 voters are treated. For n = 7, 8 voters we refer e. g. to [26, 19, 12]. Bart
de Keijzer presents a promising graded poset for weighted voting games in his master thesis [10], see also [11].3
n = 9 voters where successfully treated in [13, 23].
A similar inverse problem was solved in [3].
1.2. Our contribution. We present the first exact algorithm, besides complete enumeration of weighted voting
games, for the inverse power index problem. We computationally show that for n ≤ 15 voters the Shapley-
Shubik vector of every simple game, complete simple game or weighted voting game has a ‖ · ‖1-distance to
(0.75, 0.25, 0 . . . ) of at least 13 . For the Banzhaf power index the (conjectured) bound for the worst possible
approximation in ‖ · ‖1-distance is a bit more involved. But it seems that for n ≥ 2 voters (0.75, 0.25, 0 . . . ) is
one desired power distribution where the worst case is attained. We present computational results for n ≤ 11 for
simple games and n ≤ 16 for complete simple games and weighted voting games. For more realistic instances we
consider subsets of the European Union and determine the exact solutions for the inverse power index problem for
small numbers of voters. Additionally we present some results on the set of achievable power distributions for the
Banzhaf and the Shapley Shubik power index for n ≤ 9 voters.
1.3. Outline of the paper. In Section 2 we state the definitions of the three voting methods simple games, complete
simple games and weighted voting games. We further introduce the Banzhaf and the Shapley Shubik power index.
The known a priori estimates are the topic of Section 3. We give precise conjectures about the, with respect to
approximation via Banzhaf and Shapley Shubik vectors, worst case power distributions. In Section 4 we give an
exact algorithm for the inverse power index problem for simple games, complete simple games and weighted voting
games for the Banzhaf and the Shapley Shubik power index via an ILP formulation. Another exact approach via
exhaustive enumeration is described in Section 5. A promising combination of both methods as a branch&bound
approach is outlined in Subsection 5.1. Computational results evaluating the proposed exact algorithms for the
inverse power index problem and proving the stated conjectures for small numbers of voters are given in Section 6.
To get a more global understanding we consider the sets of achievable Banzhaf and Shapley Shubik vectors in
Section 7 and close with a conclusion in Section 7. Additionally we classify the complete set of desired power
distributions which have the worst case approximation property for very small n in an appendix.
3We would like to remark that the counts for weighted voting games with 6 ≤ n ≤ 8 voters are wrongly stated in [10], but the methods
should work.
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2. VOTING METHODS AND POWER INDICES
Consider a yes-no voting system for a set N = {1, 2, . . . , n} of n voters. The acceptance of a proposal depends
on the subset of the supporting voters. In general this can be described by a Boolean function χ : 2N → {0, 1}. A
quite natural requirement for a voting system is monotonicity, i. e. χ(U) ≤ χ(U ′) for all U ⊆ U ′ ⊆ N . Monotone
Boolean functions χ : 2N → {0, 1} with χ(∅) = 0 and χ(N) = 1 are called simple games.
Definition 1. For a simple game χ : 2N → {0, 1} a subset U ⊆ N is called a minimal winning coalition if
χ(U) = 1 and χ(U\{i}) = 0 for all i ∈ U . Analogously a subset U ⊆ N is a maximal losing coalition if
χ(U) = 0 and χ(U ∪ {i}) = 1 for all i ∈ N\U .
Each simple game is completely characterized by either the complete list W of its minimal winning coalitions
or the complete list L of its maximal losing coalitions. Both the set of minimal winning coalitions and the set of
the maximal losing coalitions are antichains. For each simple game χ there is a dual simple game χd defined via
χd(U) = 1− χ(N\U). A voter i ∈ N is called a null voter if he is not a member of at least one minimal winning
coalition.
In many applications voting systems are restricted to smaller sub classes of simple games, e. g. complete
simple games arising from Isbell’s desirability relation [9]: We write i A j for two voters i, j ∈ N iff we have
χ
(
{i} ∪ U\{j}
)
≥ χ(U) for all j ∈ U ⊆ N\{i}. A pair (N,χ) is called complete simple game if it is a simple
game and the binary relationA is a total preorder and we abbreviate i A j, j A i by i j. To factor out symmetries
we assume 1 A 2 A · · · A n and write coalitions U ⊆ N as characteristic vectors u. We call u a winning vector iff
χ(U) = 1, otherwise we call u a losing vector.
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FIGURE 1. The Hasse diagram for  on N = {1, 2, 3}.
To state an analogue of minimal winning coalitions for complete simple games we need another partial ordering:
For two coalitions u =
(
u1 . . . un
)
, v =
(
v1 . . . vn
) ∈ {0, 1}n we write u  v iff we have k∑
i=1
ui ≤
k∑
i=1
vi for all 1 ≤ k ≤ n and abbreviate u  v, u 6= v by u ≺ v, u  v, u  v by u ./ v. With this we
have χ(u) ≤ χ(v) for all u  v. By Ŵ we denote the set of all shift-minimal winning vectors, i. e. winning
vectors which are minimal with respect to . Similarly we denote by L̂ the set of all shift-maximal losing vectors,
i. e. losing vectors which are maximal with respect to . We remark that each complete simple game is uniquely
characterized by either Ŵ or L̂, see e. g. [2]. In Figure 1 we depict the Hasse diagram for  on N = {1, 2, 3}
and see that there are exactly 8 complete simple games (or antichains) for n = 3 voters; 7 with one shift-minimal
winning vector and one with two shift-minimal winning vectors.
An even more important sub class of complete simple games are weighted voting games given by non-negatives
weights wi for all i ∈ N and a quota q. The corresponding monotone Boolean function χ is obtained by
χ(U) = 1 ⇐⇒
∑
i∈U
wi ≥ q.
Algorithmically we can check whether a given simple game χ is a weighted voting game by solving a suitable
linear program, see Section 5.
In Table 3 we state the known numbers of simple games, complete simple games and weighted voting games
for n voters, see [7, 13, 23, 25]. To define two of the most important power indices for these three types of voting
methods we need another definition:
Definition 2. For a voter i ∈ N and a monotone Boolean function χ, an i-swing is a set U ⊆ N\{i} such that
χ(U) = 0 and χ(U ∪ {i}) = 1.
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n 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
#sg 1 4 18 166 7579 7828352 2414682040996 5.613043 · 1022 > 1042
#csg 1 3 8 25 117 1171 44313 16175188 284432730174
#wvg 1 3 8 25 117 1111 29373 2730164 989913344
TABLE 3. Number of simple games, complete simple games and weighted voting games for n voters.
With this we can express the Banzhaf vector (BZ(χ, 1), . . . ,BZ(χ, n)) as
BZ(χ, i) = 1
m
· |{U ⊆ N\{i} | U is an i-swing}| ,
wherem is the total number of swings. Also the Shapley-Shubik vector (SS(χ, 1), . . . ,SS(χ, n)) can be expressed
using swings via
SS(χ, i) = 1
n!
·
∑
U is an i-swing
|U |! · (n− |U | − 1)!.
Since a set U is an i-swing in a simple game χ if and only if it is an i-swing in the dual game χd, both the
Shapley-Shubik vector and the Banzhaf vector coincide for pairs of dual simple games. For both power indices the
value for a null voter is zero. Removing a null voter from a simple game with n voters gives a simple game with
n− 1 voters, where the power indices of the remaining n− 1 voters coincide.
3. A PRIORI ESTIMATES
Since heuristics can only find good solutions but are not capable of providing lower bounds we are considering
a priori estimates. The first fact coming to mind is the finite number of weighted voting games with n voters. An
upper bound of 2n
2−n+2 is given in [11]. Respecting symmetry we conclude that for n ≥ 2 there are at most
2n
2−n+2 ·n! < 2n2 ·nn different Banzhaf- or Shapley-Shubik vectors in [0, 1]n. Decomposing [0, 1]n into 2n2 ·nn
subcubes of side lenght 12nn results in at least one empty subcube using the pigeonhole principle. Thus there are
points in [0, 1]n such that the nearest Banzhaf- or Shapley-Shubik vector is at least 12n+1n apart.
Having a closer look at the swings one can obtain a slightly sharper bound. For n voters the number of swings
lies between n and
(⌊
n
2
⌋
+ 1
) · ( nbn2 c+1), see [5]. Using the fact that the numbers ηi of swings for voter i all have
the same parity we can conclude that either BZ(χ, i) = BZ(χ, j) or we have
|BZ(χ, i)− BZ(χ, j)| ≥ 2(⌊n
2
⌋
+ 1
) · ( nbn2 c+1)
for voters i and j.
Both bounds tend to zero when n tends to infinity. Recently Alon and Edelman [1] found a lower bound that
does not tend to zero:
Theorem 1. Let n > k be positive integers, let ε < 1k+1 be a positive real, and let χ be a simple game for n voters.
If
n∑
i=k+1
B(χ, i) ≤ ε, then there exists a simple game χ′ for k voters such that
‖B(χ)−B(χ′)‖1 =
k∑
i=1
|B(χ, i)−B(χ′, i)| +
n∑
i=k+1
|B(χ, i)− 0| ≤ (2k + 1)ε
1− (k + 1)ε + ε.
Alon and Edelman have chosen k = 2 and ε = 0.01 to deduce that for a simple game with
n∑
i=3
B(χ, i) ≤ 0.01
the two-dimensional vector (B(χ, 1), B(χ, 2)) lies within ‖ · ‖1-distance smaller than 116 of one of the achievable
Banzhaf vectors, i. e. (1, 0), (0, 1), or
(
1
2 ,
1
2
)
. Thus for n ≥ 2 voters the Banzhaf vector of every simple game has
an ‖ · ‖1-distance of at least min
(
0.5− 116 , 0.02
)
= 0.02 to the power distribution (0.75, 0.25, 0, . . . ).
We may improve this argument a bit by choosing k = 2 and ε = 118 to deduce that the minimal ‖ · ‖1-distance
to the power distribution (0.75, 0.25, 0, . . . ) is at least 19 , which is best possible using the general theorem.
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Conjecture 1. For n ≥ 2 voters consider the following desired power distribution: d1 = 0.75, d2 = 0.25,
and di = 0 for 3 ≤ i ≤ n. For each simple game (complete simple game or weighted voting game) χ we
have the inequalities ‖SS(χ) − d‖1 =
n∑
i=1
|SS(χ, i)− di| ≥ 13 and ‖BZ(χ) − d‖1 =
n∑
i=1
|BZ(χ, i)− di| ≥
kdn2 e
ldn2 e
, where k1 = 1, km =
{
2km−1 : m ≡ 0 mod 2,
8km−1 − 1 : m ≡ 1 mod 2 for m ≥ 2 and l1 = 2, l2 = 5, lm ={
2lm−1 + 3 : m ≡ 0 mod 2,
8lm−1 − 2 : m ≡ 1 mod 2 for m ≥ 3.
m 2 3 4 5 6 7
km
lm
1
2 = 0.5
2
5 = 0.4
15
18 ≈ 0.39474 3079 ≈ 0.37975 239630 ≈ 0.37937 4781263 ≈ 0.37846
TABLE 4. Values of kmlm – the conjectured lower bound for the Banzhaf index.
Using τ(n) = (−1)
n+1+1
2 a closed expression for these numbers
km
lm
, see also Table 4, is given by km =
7·22m−2+τ(m)+2−τ(m)
15 and lm = 2
2m−3+τ(m) + 11·2
2m−2+τ(m)+1−23τ(m)
15 for m ≥ 2. Thus we have limm→∞
km
lm
=
14
37 ≈ 0.378378 > 13 .
Conjecture 1 looks rather specific. A first hint why d1 = 0.75, d2 = 0.25 might be hard to approximate is the
fact that this point maximizes the ‖·‖1-distance to the achievable power vectors (1, 0), (0.5, 0.5), (0, 1), both for the
Shapley-Shubik and the Banzhaf index. For some small n > 2 we compute the points or regions which maximize
the ‖ · ‖1-distance to the achievable power vectors in Appendix A. So far we have not seen a geometric structure
behind the values kmlm for the Banzhaf index, but computing these numbers for simple games and weighted voting
games with n ≤ 16 suggests that the rather structured recursion formulas for km and lm might be more than a pure
coincidence. Having Theorem 1 in mind one might conjecture that power distributions with many zeros are hard
to approximate whenever they are hard to approximate without the zero values. A first step towards understanding
the inverse power index problem might be the results on achievable hierarchies in simple games, see [8].
Additionally we conjecture that there is a similar result as Theorem 1 for the Shapley-Shubik index. In the next
sections we will present some exact algorithms to solve the inverse power index problem and use them to prove
Conjecture 1 for small n.
Conjecture 2. For each desired power distribution di with di ≥ 0 and
n∑
i=1
di = 1, where n ≥ 3, there exist two
weighted voting games (complete simple games or simple games) χ, χ′ with ‖BZ(χ)−d‖1 =
n∑
i=1
|BZ(χ, i)− di| ≤
kdn2 e
ldn2 e
and ‖SS(χ′)− d‖1 =
n∑
i=1
|SS(χ′, i)− di| ≤ 13 .
4. AN ILP FORMULATION FOR THE INVERSE POWER INDEX PROBLEM
Our first exact approach to solve the inverse power index problem is to utilize an ILP formulation using ILOG
CPLEX 11 as an ILP solver. Therefore let n be the number of voters and d = (d1, . . . , dn) the desired power
distribution with di ≥ 0 and
n∑
i=1
di = 1. To model the monotone Boolean function χ we use binary variables xU
which equal χ(U) for all subsets U ⊆ N . In order to express the values SS(χ, i) and BZ(χ, i) of the power indices
for voter i we additionally introduce binary variables yi,U which equal one iff U is an i-swing, see Equation (5)
With this we can state the Shapley-Shubik value for voter i as
SS(i) = pi = 1
n!
·
∑
U⊆N\{i}
(
|U |! · (n− |U | − 1)!
)
· yi,U
and the number of i-swings as si =
∑
U⊆N\{i}
yi,U for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n. To measure the deviation |pi − di| for voter i
we introduce variables δi and obtain the following binary ILP formulation for the inverse Shapley-Shubik index
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problem with ‖ · ‖1-norm on simple games:
min
n∑
i=1
δi(1)
s.t. pi ≤ di + δi ∀1 ≤ i ≤ n,(2)
pi ≥ di − δi ∀1 ≤ i ≤ n,(3)
pi =
1
n!
·
∑
U⊆N\{i}
(
|U |! · (n− |U | − 1)!
)
· yi,U ∀1 ≤ i ≤ n,(4)
yi,U = xU∪{i} − xU ∀1 ≤ i ≤ n,U ⊆ N\{i},(5)
xU ≥ xU\{j} ∀∅ 6= U ⊆ N, j ∈ U,(6)
x∅ = 0(7)
xN = 1(8)
xU ∈ {0, 1} ∀U ⊆ N,(9)
yi,U ∈ {0, 1} ∀1 ≤ i ≤ n,U ⊆ N\{i},(10)
δi ≥ 0 ∀1 ≤ i ≤ n,(11)
pi ≥ 0 ∀1 ≤ i ≤ n.(12)
Of course we may directly eliminate all variables yi,U and pi from this formulation. The equations and inequal-
ities (6), (7), (8), and (9) enforce that χ is a simple game. To restrict χ to complete simple games only small
adjustments are necessary: We replace the subsets U ⊆ N by its characteristic vectors u ∈ {0, 1}n and rewrite
Inequality (6) to xu ≤ xv for all u, v ∈ {0, 1}n with u  v, or more economically to
(13) xu ≤ xv ∀v ∈ {0, 1}n, u ∈→ v : ‖v‖1 6= 0,
where→ v denotes the set of elements arising from v by an right-shift of one of the rightmost 1s in v. Examples
are given by→ (1, 0, 1, 0) = {(1, 0, 0, 1), (0, 1, 1, 0)} and→ (1, 0, 1) = {(1, 0, 0), (0, 1, 1)}.
To restrict χ to weighted voting games we additionally have to introduce weights wi ≥ 0 and a quota q > 0.
To be able to decide whether
∑
i∈U
wi ≥ q or
∑
i∈U
wi < q in the framework of ILPs we restrict ourself to weights wi
which differ by at least one whenever they are different. (We may simply use integer weights, which could result
in harder problems for the ILP solver.) To interlink the xU with the wi and q we use
(14) q − (1− xU ) ·M −
∑
i∈U
wi ≤ 0 ∀U ⊆ N
and
(15) − xU ·M +
∑
i∈U
wi ≤ q − 1 ∀U ⊆ N,
where M is an suitably large constant fulfilling M − 1 ≥
n∑
i=1
wi. (We may choose M = 4n
(
n+1
4
)(n+1)/2
, see [17,
Theorem 9.3.2.1].) Now let us argue why Inequalities (14) and (15) are necessary and sufficient. If xU = 1 in (14)
and xU = 0 in (15) then the inequalities are equivalent to
∑
i∈U
wi ≥ q and
∑
i∈U
wi ≤ q − 1, respectively. Otherwise
(for xU ∈ {0, 1}) both sets of inequalities are valid due to M − 1 ≥
n∑
i=1
wi. So we have given ILP formulations for
the considered three types of voting methods when the Shapley-Shubik index and the ‖ · ‖1-norm is used.
For the Banzhaf index we have to tackle the fact that its value for voter i is given by the following non-linear
equality BZ(i) = sin∑
j=1
sj
and we have to evaluate the deviation
n∑
i=1
|BZ(i)− di| =
∣∣∣∣∣∣ sin∑
j=1
sj
− di
∣∣∣∣∣∣.
To this end we set s =
n∑
i=1
si and δi = |si − di · s|. Instead of minimizing the sum of the δi we introduce
n∑
i=1
δi ≤ α · s, where α ∈ (0, 2] is a properly chosen constant. With this we can state: If the following binary ILP
has a solution then the corresponding simple game χ approximates the desired power distribution d with an error
in the ‖ · ‖1-norm of at most α. Otherwise no such approximation is possible. Thus we can minimize the deviation
in the ‖ · ‖1-norm by performing a bisection on α. (Since s lies between n and
(⌊
n
2
⌋
+ 1
) · ( nbn2 c+1), each two
unequal Banzhaf vectors differ by at least
(
1
n2n
)2
, and we only need O(n) such steps.)
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n∑
i=1
si = s,(16)
n∑
i=1
δi ≤ α · s,(17)
si ≤ di · s+ δi ∀1 ≤ i ≤ n,(18)
si ≥ di · s− δi ∀1 ≤ i ≤ n,(19)
si =
∑
U⊆N\{i}
yi,U ∀1 ≤ i ≤ n,(20)
yi,U = xU∪{i} − xU ∀1 ≤ i ≤ n,U ⊆ N\{i},(21)
xU ≥ xU\{j} ∀∅ 6= U ⊆ N, j ∈ U,(22)
x∅ = 0(23)
xN = 1(24)
xU ∈ {0, 1} ∀U ⊆ N,(25)
yi,U ∈ {0, 1} ∀1 ≤ i ≤ n,U ⊆ N\{i},(26)
δi ≥ 0 ∀1 ≤ i ≤ n,(27)
si ≥ 0 ∀1 ≤ i ≤ n.(28)
Of course we can apply similar adjustments for this ILP formulation as we did for the one modeling the Shapley-
Shubik index to restrict the voting method χ, described by the xU , to complete simple games or weighted voting
games.
4.1. Simplification for Conjecture 1. In order to computationally prove Conjecture 1 for the Shapley-Shubik
index and small n we remove some variables and constraints from the previous ILP formulation. Since for the
power distribution d = (0.75, 0.25, 0 . . . ) we have
n∑
i=1
δi = d1+ d2+(1− p1− p2) we can delete all variables and
constraints for i ≥ 3:
min d1 + d2 + 1− p1 − p2
s.t. pi ≤ di + δi ∀1 ≤ i ≤ 2,
pi ≥ di − δi ∀1 ≤ i ≤ 2,
pi =
1
n!
·
∑
U⊆N\{i}
(
|U |! · (n− |U | − 1)!
)
· yi,U ∀1 ≤ i ≤ 2,
yi,U = xU∪{i} − xU ∀1 ≤ i ≤ 2, U ⊆ N\{i},
xU ≥ xU\{j} ∀∅ 6= U ⊆ N,U ∩ {1, 2} 6= ∅, j ∈ U,
x∅ = 0,
xN = 1,
xU ∈ {0, 1} ∀U ⊆ N,
yi,U ∈ {0, 1} ∀1 ≤ i ≤ 2, U ⊆ N\{i},
δ1, δ2 ≥ 0,
p1, p2 ≥ 0.
5. AN EXHAUSTIVE ENUMERATION APPROACH FOR THE INVERSE POWER INDEX PROBLEM
The conceptionally easiest exact algorithm to solve the inverse power index problem is to loop over the finite
set of all voting methods and to pick that one that minimizes the deviation between the desired and the achieved
power distribution. Table 3 proves this approach to be infeasible for simple games and n ≥ 8. For complete
simple games there exists a very effective parameterization, see [2]. But, to our knowledge, nobody has determined
the number of complete simple games for n ≥ 10 yet. On the one hand the fraction of complete simple games
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which are weighted voting games tends to zero as the number of voters tends to infinity, but on the other hand no
parameterization of weighted voting games is known. Several recursive constructions, mostly using super classes
of weighted voting games, are presented in the literature [11, 12, 7, 19]. Here we will describe the approach of
[7, 6] which exhaustively generates the whole class of complete simple games in the first run and afterwards checks
each complete simple game whether it is weighted or not via a linear program, see also [24, 13]. One variant is
given by
n∑
i=1
uiwi ≥ q ∀u ∈ Ŵ ,(29)
1 +
n∑
i=1
viwi ≤ q ∀v ∈ L̂,(30)
wi ≥ wi+1 ∀1 ≤ i ≤ n− 1,(31)
wn, q ≥ 0.(32)
For n = 9 voters it seems inconceivable to solve 284432730174 linear programs in order to determine all weighted
voting games, nevertheless this is – more or less – what was done in [23]4. A more effective way is described in
[13] and uses partial complete simple games.
As mentioned before a complete simple game can be characterized by its set Ŵ of shift-minimal winning vectors.
Now we want to exhaustively generate complete simple games for a given number of voters using an orderly
generation approach, see [21], i. e. we start with an empty set W and add shift-minimal winning vectors, which are
decreasing with respect to the lexicographical ordering ≤lex5, step by step. In the corresponding generation tree for
a node W all successors W ′ fulfill W ⊆ W ′ and y <lex x for all x ∈ W , y ∈ W ′\W . Now let L and L′ be the set
of all shift-maximal losing coalitions corresponding to W and W ′. For a given set W 6= ∅ with lexicographically
smallest element w we define L˜ :=
{
v ∈ Bn | ∃u ∈ W : v ≺ u
}
∪
{
v ∈ Bn | @u ∈ W ∪ {x ∈ Bn | x <lex w} :
v  u
}
, where B = {0, 1} and condense the shift-maximal vectors of L˜ to a set L˙ ⊆ L˜. With this we have L˙ ⊆ L
and L˙ ⊆ L′ for all successors of W . Thus whenever the previous linear program where Ŵ is replaced by W and L̂
is replaced by L˙ is infeasible, we can prune the whole search tree below node W .
Let us have an example for n = 7 voters to illustrate the proposed algorithm. For the partial set W =
{1110000, 1101010, 1001111} of shift-minimal winning vectors we can determine the partial set
L˙ = {1101000, 1011010, 1100110, 1101001, 0101111}
of shift-maximal losing vectors. Here 1101000 is an element of L˙ since we have 1101000 ≺ 1110000 ∈W . Since
the linear program corresponding to W and L˙ is infeasible we know that none of the complete simple games given
by the set W ∪X of shift-maximal winning vectors is weighted, where
X ⊂ {0101111, 0101110, 0101101, 0011111, 0011110, 0011101} .
So at least 7 complete games are shown to be non-weighted by solving one linear program.
Using the concept of orderly generation and partial complete games drastically reduces computation times.
However the number of weighted voting games for n = 10 voters remains unknown. So this approach is limited to
rather small numbers of voters.
5.1. A branch&bound approach for the inverse power index problem for weighted voting games. Since
we will see in Section 6 that the LP relaxation of our ILP models from Section 4 is rather weak we propose a
branch&bound algorithm based on the discrete structure of partial complete games.
As in Section 5 we start with an empty setW of the shift-minimal winning vectors. Again we generate complete
simple games via orderly generation and prune the subtree of W whenever W can not be extended to a weighted
voting game. To further prune the search tree we additionally use the information ofW and the partial set L˙ of shift-
maximal losing vectors to determine some of the xU -values in the ILPs of Section 4. We need a computationally
cheap lower bound on the deviation between the values of the given power index for all voting methods χ below
node W and the desired power distribution d. If the best known solution so far is better than this lower bound,
we can prune the search tree. A quite natural candidate for such a lower bound is the LP relaxation of our ILP
4Additionally some computational tricks and heuristics were used to reduce the number of linear programs.
5Here one may also read the coalition vectors as integers written in their binary expansion and use the ordinary ordering ≤ of integers.
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models from Section 4. To know good solutions right in the beginning of our branch&bound tree we may utilize
any heuristics for the inverse power index problem. In this paper we consider Leech’s algorithm.
6. COMPUTATIONAL RESULTS
state pop. state pop. state pop.
Austria 8200 Germany 82500 Netherlands 16300
Belgium 10400 Greece 11100 Poland 38200
Bulgaria 7800 Hungary 10200 Portugal 10100
Cyprus 700 Ireland 4100 Romania 21700
Czech Republic 10500 Italy 58500 Slovakia 5400
Denmark 5400 Latvia 3400 Slovenia 2000
Estonia 1300 Lithuania 2300 Spain 43000
Finland 5200 Luxembourg 500 Sweden 9000
France 60000 Malta 400 United Kingdom 60600
TABLE 5. Population (in thousands) of the 27 member states of the European Union.
simple games complete simple games
inst. ‖ · ‖1 nodes time ‖ · ‖1 nodes time
EU1 0.00000 · 10−0 1 0.01s 0.00000 · 10−0 1 0.01s
EU2 7.69740 · 10−2 1 0.01s 7.69740 · 10−2 1 0.01s
EU3 7.13793 · 10−2 5 0.05s 7.13793 · 10−2 4 0.01s
EU4 6.30740 · 10−2 28 0.01s 6.30740 · 10−2 9 0.02s
EU5 6.90250 · 10−2 303 0.09s 6.90250 · 10−2 26 0.04s
EU6 4.18923 · 10−2 18265 5.91s 5.40190 · 10−2 35 0.11s
EU7 2.39402 · 10−2 71483741 15.88h 3.75078 · 10−2 54 0.41s
EU8 1.78178 · 10−2 210 3.08s
EU9 6.89922 · 10−3 1271 95.91s
EU10 3.65220 · 10−3 19520 101.21m
EU11 1.31318 · 10−3 349125 55.25h
TABLE 6. Results for the EU using the Shapley-Shubik power index.
As a realistic input instance for the inverse power index problem we use the 27 countries of the European
Union with population numbers popi given in Table 5. Instance EUn consists of the n countries with the largest
population, where the desired power is given by
di =
√
popi
n∑
j=1
√
popj
,
i. e. we apply Penrose square root law. In Table 6 and Table 7 we state the results for simple games, complete
simple games, and weighted voting games, respectively, using the Shapley-Shubik power index.
The weighted voting games corresponding to Table 7 can be represented by their quota and their weights yield-
ing: [1; 1], [2; 1, 1], [2; 1, 1, 1], [3; 1, 1, 1, 1], [4; 1, 1, 1, 1, 1], [14; 5, 5, 4, 4, 3, 3], [18; 9, 8, 7, 7, 6, 5, 4],
[41; 13, 11, 11, 10, 9, 9, 7, 6], [92; 30, 27, 27, 26, 23, 22, 17, 16, 14], [109; 34, 29, 29, 28, 25, 23, 18, 16, 14, 13], and
[339; 96, 82, 81, 80, 71, 65, 51, 44, 38, 36, 36].
For n ≤ 5 the optimal solutions for simple games and complete simple games coincide. For larger n simple
games admit better approximations but require a huge amount of cpu time. For n ≤ 9 the optimal solutions for com-
plete simple games and weighted voting games coincide. We would like to remark that for weighted voting games
the Inequalities (14) and (15) would suffice if the y-variables are binaries but adding the valid Inequalities (13)
drastically reduces the necessary cpu time.
We would like to remark that our ILP formulations for the inverse power index problem have a large integrality
gap so that the lower bound stays zero for a long time during the solution process. Being more precisely we state
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weighted voting games
inst. ‖ · ‖1 nodes time lower bound
EU1 0.00000 · 10−0 1 0.01s 0.00000 · 10−0
EU2 7.69740 · 10−2 3 0.01s 7.69740 · 10−2
EU3 7.13793 · 10−2 9 0.01s 7.13793 · 10−2
EU4 6.30740 · 10−2 5 0.02s 6.30740 · 10−2
EU5 6.90250 · 10−2 23 0.04s 6.86700 · 10−3
EU6 5.40190 · 10−2 29 0.17s 2.52257 · 10−2
EU7 3.75078 · 10−2 44 0.40s 4.97897 · 10−3
EU8 1.78178 · 10−2 165 2.86s 2.20380 · 10−3
EU9 6.89924 · 10−3 1449 49.65s 7.19156 · 10−4
EU10 5.35622 · 10−3 27517 28.68m 1.12706 · 10−3
EU11 3.62854 · 10−3 676774 69.16h 1.14349 · 10−4
TABLE 7. Results for the EU using the Shapley-Shubik power index.
n 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
LP-bound 0 0 0 0 1 · 10−6 1 · 10−6 1.4 · 10−6 0
n 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
LP-bound 9 · 10−7 8 · 10−7 1 · 10−7 3 · 10−7 2 · 10−7 8 · 10−7 6 · 10−7
TABLE 8. Lower LP-bounds for the instances EUn for simple games, complete simple games,
and weighted voting games.
the lower LP-bounds for the instances EUn for 1 ≤ n ≤ 15 players. It turns out that these bounds coincide for
simple games, complete simple, and weighted voting games, but there are differences in the necessary computation
times. The simple games for n ≥ 13 took 14 seconds, 1 minute, and 6 minutes, respectively. For complete simple
games the computation times for n ≥ 13 are 2 seconds, 8 seconds, and 4 minutes. Solving the linear programs
for weighted voting games with n ≥ 13 took substantially longer: 4 minutes, 3 minutes and 55 minutes. For the
instances hardn, see below, we remark that for all considered voting methods and 2 ≤ n ≤ 16 voters the lower
LP-bound was given by zero and that we have observed a similar behavior of the computation times.
Since the given LP formulation is that weak, in terms of the integrality gap, we might use the general restrictions
on the achievable power vectors from Section 3. Another possibility to obtain a lower bound is to drop the x-
variables from our ILP formulations and to aggregate the yi,U -variables to zi,|U |-variables:
min
n∑
i=1
δi
s.t. di − δi ≤ pi ≤ di + δi ∀1 ≤ i ≤ n,
n! · pi =
dn−22 e∑
j=0
j! · (n− j − 1)! · yi,j ∀1 ≤ i ≤ n,
n∑
i=1
pi = 1,(33)
zi,j ≤ 2 ·
(
n− 1
j
)
∀1 ≤ i ≤ n, ∀0 ≤ j ≤
⌊
n− 2
2
⌋
,
zi,n−12
≤
(
n− 1
n−1
2
)
∀1 ≤ i ≤ n, n ≡ 1 (mod 2),
zi,j ∈ N ∀1 ≤ i ≤ n, ∀0 ≤ j ≤
⌈
n− 2
2
⌉
,
δi ≥ 0 ∀1 ≤ i ≤ n.
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Although the resulting lower bound, see the sixth column in Table 7 6, is valid even for simple games, it turns out
to be very useful, at least for small n. If we drop Equation (33) the ILP decomposes into n simpler ILPs which can
be solved more directly, e. g. via enumeration.
simple games complete simple games
inst. ‖ · ‖1 nodes time ‖ · ‖1 nodes time
hard2 0.5000 1 0.01s 0.5000 1 0.01s
hard3 0.3333 1 0.07s 0.3333 1 0.07s
hard4 0.3333 6 0.05s 0.3333 7 0.01s
hard5 0.3333 14 0.02s 0.3333 10 0.02s
hard6 0.3333 28 0.09s 0.3333 22 0.03s
hard7 0.3333 31 0.11s 0.3333 35 0.05s
hard8 0.3333 33 0.19s 0.3333 43 0.12s
hard9 0.3333 43 0.73s 0.3333 54 0.33s
hard10 0.3333 69 2.30s 0.3333 127 0.78s
hard11 0.3333 183 21.31s 0.3333 126 2.85s
hard12 0.3333 177 170.56s 0.3333 207 18.62s
hard13 0.3333 151 761.24s 0.3333 221 141.79s
hard14 0.3333 2354 4.32h 0.3333 194 12.52m
hard15 0.3333 3309 23.49h 0.3333 353 1.22h
hard16 0.3333 829 53.67h
TABLE 9. Results for the desired power distribution (0.75, 0.25, 0, . . . ) using the Shapley-
Shubik power index.
Following Conjecture 1 and 2 for n ≥ 2 we consider the instances hardn corresponding to the desired power
distribution d = (0.75, 0.25, 0, . . . ). In Table 9 and Table 10 we list the results for simple games, complete simple
games, and weighted voting games, respectively, using the Shapley-Shubik power index.
weighted voting games
inst. ‖ · ‖1 nodes time
hard2 0.5000 1 0.01s
hard3 0.3333 3 0.02s
hard4 0.3333 6 0.02s
hard5 0.3333 13 0.03s
hard6 0.3333 19 0.05s
hard7 0.3333 31 0.08s
hard8 0.3333 36 0.17s
hard9 0.3333 60 0.43s
hard10 0.3333 101 1.47s
hard11 0.3333 153 4.05s
hard12 0.3333 208 41.09s
hard13 0.3333 143 252.71s
hard14 0.3333 339 51.14m
hard15 0.3333 579 6.73h
hard16 0.3333 1087 36.80h
TABLE 10. Results for the desired power distribution (0.75, 0.25, 0, . . . ) using the Shapley-
Shubik power index.
In Table 11 and Table 12 we list the results for simple games, complete simple games, and weighted voting
games, respectively, using the Banzhaf power index.
6We may also add inequalities to ensure that all numbers of swings for a given voter have the same parity.
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simple games complete simple games
inst. ‖ · ‖1 nodes time ‖ · ‖1 nodes time
hard2 0.5000000 1 0.01s 0.5000000 1 0.01s
hard3 0.4000000 6 0.01s 0.4000000 5 0.07s
hard4 0.4000000 11 0.01s 0.4000000 9 0.17s
hard5 0.3947368 36 0.02s 0.3947368 13 0.25s
hard6 0.3947368 46 0.10s 0.3947368 21 0.26s
hard7 0.3797468 177 0.27s 0.3797468 15 0.18s
hard8 0.3797468 1923 7.80s 0.3797468 55 1.15s
hard9 0.3793651 11801 82.46s 0.3793651 61 2.42s
hard10 0.3793651 167868 57.60s 0.3793651 61 17.11s
hard11 0.3784640 311199 140.85m 0.3784640 110 131.67s
hard12 0.3784640 119 18.07m
hard13 0.3784399 119 87.85m
hard14 0.3784399 191 9.48h
hard15 0.3783563 217 23.78h
hard16 0.3783563 248 6.84d
TABLE 11. Results for the desired power distribution (0.75, 0.25, 0, . . . ) using the Banzhaf
power index.
weighted voting games
inst. ‖ · ‖1 nodes time representation
hard2 0.5000000 1 0.01s [1;1,0]
hard3 0.4000000 6 0.17s [3;2,1,1]
hard4 0.4000000 26 0.16s [3;2,1,1,0]
hard5 0.3947368 18 0.17s [5;4,1,1,1,1]
hard6 0.3947368 45 0.28s [5;4,1,1,1,1,0]
hard7 0.3797468 38 0.62s [14;11,3,3,3,2,1,1]
hard8 0.3797468 55 1.41s [14;11,3,3,3,2,1,1,0]
hard9 0.3793651 50 4.00s [33;26,7,7,7,5,2,2,1,1]
hard10 0.3793651 73 24.20s [33;26,7,7,7,5,2,2,1,1,0]
hard11 0.3784640 138 140.95s [80;63,17,17,17,12,5,5,2,2,1,1]
hard12 0.3784640 108 26.64m [80;63,17,17,17,12,5,5,2,2,1,1,0]
hard13 0.3784399 111 75.33m [193;152,41,41,41,29,12,12,5,5,2,2,1,1]
hard14 0.3784399 153 12.30h [193;152,41,41,41,29,12,12,5,5,2,2,1,1,0]
hard15 0.3783563 151 1.31d [466;367,99,99,99,70,29,29,12,12,5,5,2,2,1,1]
hard16 0.3783563 116 2.34d [466;367,99,99,99,70,29,29,12,12,5,5,2,2,1,1,0]
TABLE 12. Results for the desired power distribution (0.75, 0.25, 0, . . . ) using the Banzhaf
power index.
7. POWER DISTRIBUTIONS WHICH ARE HARD TO APPROXIMATE
In the previous section we have computationally shown that the desired power distribution (0.75, 0.25, 0, . . . ) is
hard to approximate by Shapley-Shubik or Banzhaf power vectors. Since it is reported that the proposed heuristics
for the inverse power index problem perform well on practical instances one may conjecture that achievable power
vectors are dense in those regions which are of practical importance and that the bad approximation property of
(0.75, 0.25, 0, . . . ) is a very singular phenomenon.
To shed some light on this matter we will consider two dimensional projections of the set of all achievable power
distributions for small n. For 1 ≤ i < j ≤ n and a (normalized) power index P we define APi,j =
{(x, y) | ∃ wvg χ consisting of n ordered voters with P(i) = x,P(j) = y} .
to be the set of all achievable power vectors for ordered weighted voting games consisting of n voters and a given
power index P . By ordered we mean that voter i is as least as powerful as voter i+ 1 for all 1 ≤ i < n.
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FIGURE 2. Projections to the first two voters of achievable power distributions for 6 ≤ n ≤ 9
voters and the power indices Banzhaf and Shapley Shubik, i. e. the setsAP1,2 for P ∈ {BZ,SS}.
Lemma 1. For (x, y) ∈ APi,j with 1 ≤ i ≤ n we have
1 ≥ x ≥ y ≥ 0,
(j − 1) · x+ (n− j + 1) · y ≥ 1 for i = 1, and
i · x+ (j − i) · y ≤ 1.
Proof. Since we assume P(1) ≥ P(2) ≥ · · · ≥ P(n) we have x ≥ y and P(h) ≥ P(j) for all h ≤ j. Inserting
this into
n∑
h=1
P(h) = 1 yields the stated inequalities. 
In Figure 2 we illustrate these sets for 6 ≤ n ≤ 9 and P ∈ {BZ,SS} in the following way. We have
AP1,2 ⊆ [0, 1]×
[
0, 12
]
and color the pixels of [0, 1]× [0, 12] in different colors. For (x, y) is ruled out by Lemma 1
we use red pixels and otherwise a scale of colors from dark blue to green. Here we use dark blue if (x, y) (actually
all points in the near of (x, y)) is not contained in AP1,2. By light blue we denote that some elements of AP1,2 are
in the near of (x, y) and by green we denote the case when there are many elements of AP1,2 are in the near of
(x, y). The value for voter 1 increases from left to right and the value for voter 2 increases from top to bottom. The
graphics on the left hand side of Figure 2 correspond to the Banzhaf power index and those on the right hand side
to the Shapley Shubik power index.
By a look at Figure 2 it seems that there might exist a certain subset of [0, 1]2 which remains empty (or dark
blue) if n tends to infinity and we factor out the intrinsic discrete nature of the problem. But of course proving such
a property might be a very challenging task.
8. CONCLUSION
With the inverse power index problem we have presented a very challenging optimization problem of practical
importance. Besides exhaustive enumeration we have developed the first exact algorithm to tackle this problem
via an ILP formulation. The first computational results are very promising but of course a lot of work using more
sophisticated techniques from integer linear (or non-linear) programming has to be done. We give a very precise
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conjecture on the power distributions with the worst case approximation property and reveal some structure of the
set of achievable power distributions by the Banzhaf and the Shapley Shubik power index. In our opinion it would
be very challenging to prove these conjectures. Another open problem, which might be not too hard to solve, is to
prove an analogue of Alon’s and Edelman’s result for the Shapley Shubik or other power indices. We leave open
the problem to design a practical algorithm for the inverse power index problem, i. e. an algorithm combining fast
primal heuristics and techniques for lower bounds in order to solve the problem either exactly or with a certain error
guarantee.
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APPENDIX A. REGIONS WHICH ARE HARD TO APPROXIMATE
In Conjecture 1 and Conjecture 2 we state that the desired power distribution d = (0.75, 0.25, 0, . . . ) is the
worst possible example with respect to approximation in the ‖ · ‖1-norm using one of the three presented voting
methods and the Shapley-Shubik power index. In this section we want to show that there are further desired power
distributions which are equally hard to approximate, at least for small n.
We restrict ourselves on complete simple games and weighted voting games, which coincide for n ≤ 5 voters.
For n ≤ 2 and the Shapley-Shubik or the Banzhaf power index we only have the following achievable power
distributions s11 = (1), s
2
1 = (1, 0), and s
2
2 = (0.5, 0.5) up to symmetry, i. e. we assume that the power is
decreasing monotonely. Let d = (d1, . . . , dn) be a theoretically possible desired power distribution, i. e. we have
di ≥ 0 and
n∑
i=1
di = 1. To avoid symmetric situations we assume di ≥ di+1 for all 1 ≤ i < n in the following.
Since there exists only one such theoretically possible desired power distribution we cannot say something
interesting for n = 1 voters.
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Lemma 2. For n = 2 and the Shapley-Shubik or the Banzhaf power index the regions where min
χ
‖d− P(χ)‖1 = 12
are given by d = (0.75, 0.25).
Proof. If d1 > 0.75 we have |1− d1| + |0− d2| < 0.25 + 0.25 = 12 and for 12 ≤ d1 < 0.75 we have d2 > 0.25
and |0.5− d1|+ |0.5− d2| < 0.25 + 0.25 = 12 . 
For n = 3 voters the achievable power distributions for the Shapley-Shubik index up to symmetry are s31 =
(1, 0, 0), s32 =
(
2
3 ,
1
6 ,
1
6
)
, s33 =
(
1
2 ,
1
2 , 0
)
, and s34 =
(
1
3 ,
1
3 ,
1
3
)
.
Lemma 3. For n = 3 the regions where min
χ
‖d− SS(χ)‖1 = 13 are given by
• d1 = 56 , 112 ≤ d2 ≤ 16 ,
• 23 ≤ d1 ≤ 56 , d1 + d2 = 1 (i.e. d3 = 0),
• 12 ≤ d1 ≤ 23 , d2 = 13 ,
• d1 = 12 , 14 ≤ d2 ≤ 13 , and
• 512 ≤ d1 ≤ 12 , d1 + d2 = 56 (i.e. d3 = 16 ).
Proof. (1) For d1 ≥ 56 we have
∥∥s31 − d∥∥1 = 2− 2d1 ≤ 13 , where equality is attained iff d1 = 56 .
(2.1) For 23 ≤ d1 ≤ 56 and d2 ≤ 16 we have
∥∥s32 − d∥∥1 = 2d1 − 43 ≤ 13 , where equality is attained iff d1 = 56 .
(2.2) For 23 ≤ d1 ≤ 56 and d2 ≥ 16 we have d3 ≤ 16 and
∥∥s32 − d∥∥1 = 13 − 2d3 ≤ 13 , where equality is attained
iff d3 = 0, i. e. d1 + d2 = 1.
(3.1) For 12 ≤ d1 ≤ 23 and d3 ≥ 16 we have
∥∥s32 − d∥∥1 = 43 − 2d1 ≤ 13 , where equality is attained iff d1 = 12 .
(3.2) For 12 ≤ d1 ≤ 23 , d3 ≤ 16 , and d2 ≤ 13 we have d2 ≥ 16 and
∥∥s32 − d∥∥1 = 2d2 − 13 ≤ 13 , where equality is
attained iff d2 = 13 .
(3.3) For 12 ≤ d1 ≤ 23 and d2 ≥ 13 we have d2 ≤ 12 and
∥∥s33 − d∥∥1 = 1 − 2d2 ≤ 13 , where equality is attained
iff d2 = 13 .
(4.1) For 512 ≤ d1 ≤ 12 and d3 ≤ 16 we have d2 ≤ 12 and
∥∥s33 − d∥∥1 = 2d3 ≤ 13 , where equality is attained iff
d3 =
1
6 .
(4.2) For 512 ≤ d1 ≤ 12 and d2 ≤ 13 we have
∥∥s34 − d∥∥1 = 2d1 − 23 ≤ 13 , where equality is attained iff d1 = 12 .
(4.3) For 512 ≤ d1 ≤ 12 , d3 ≥ 16 , and d2 ≥ 13 we have d3 ≤ 14 < 13 and
∥∥s34 − d∥∥1 = 23 − 2d3 ≤ 13 , where
equality is attained iff d3 = 16 .
(5.1) For 13 ≤ d1 ≤ 512 and d2 ≥ 13 we have 16 ≤ d3 ≤ 13 and
∥∥s34 − d∥∥1 = 23 − 2d3 ≤ 13 , where equality is
attained iff d3 = 16 .
(5.2) For 13 ≤ d1 ≤ 512 and d2 ≤ 13 we have
∥∥s34 − d∥∥1 = 2d1 − 23 < 13 .
It remains to check, whether
∥∥s3i − d∥∥1 = 13 for the stated subspaces. This is easily verified. 
For the Banzhaf power index and 3 voters the achievable power distributions up to symmetry are b31 = (1, 0, 0),
b32 =
(
3
5 ,
1
5 ,
1
5
)
, b33 =
(
1
2 ,
1
2 , 0
)
, and b34 =
(
1
3 ,
1
3 ,
1
3
)
.
Lemma 4. For n = 3 the regions where min
χ
‖d− BZ(χ)‖1 = 25 are given by d1 = 45 , 110 ≤ d2 ≤ 15 and d1 = 34 ,
d2 =
1
4 .
Proof. (1) For d1 ≥ 45 we have
∥∥b31 − d∥∥1 = 2− 2d1 ≤ 25 , where equality is attained iff d1 = 45 .
(2.1) For 35 ≤ d1 ≤ 45 and d2 ≥ 15 we have d3 ≤ 15 and
∥∥b32 − d∥∥1 = 25 − 2d3 ≤ 25 , where equality is attained
iff d3 = 0. So here we can proceed as in the proof of Lemma 2 to deduce min
χ
‖d− BZ(χ)‖1 < 25 for
d1 6= 34 .
(2.2) For 35 ≤ d1 ≤ 45 and d2 ≤ 15 we have
∥∥b32 − d∥∥1 = 2d1 − 65 ≤ 25 , where equality is attained iff d1 = 45 .
(3.1) For 12 ≤ d1 ≤ 35 and d2 ≥ 310 we have d2 ≤ 12 and
∥∥b33 − d∥∥1 = 1− 2d2 ≤ 25 , where equality is attained
iff d2 = 310 . For
1
2 ≤ d1 ≤ 35 and d2 = 310 we have d3 ≤ 15 and
∥∥b32 − d∥∥1 = 15 < 25 .
(3.2) For 12 ≤ d1 ≤ 35 , d2 ≤ 310 , and d3 ≤ 15 we have d2 ≥ 15 and
∥∥b32 − d∥∥1 = 2d2 − 25 < 25 .
(3.3) For 12 ≤ d1 ≤ 35 and d3 ≥ 15 we have
∥∥b32 − d∥∥1 = 65 − 2d1 < 25 .
(4.1) For d1 ≤ 12 and d3 ≤ 15 we have d2 ≤ 12 and
∥∥b33 − d∥∥1 = 2d3 ≤ 25 , where equality is attained iff d3 = 15 .
(4.2) For 25 ≤ d1 ≤ 12 and d3 ≥ 15 we have d2 ≥ 15 and
∥∥b32 − d∥∥1 = 65 − 2d1 ≤ 25 , where equality is attained
iff d1 = 25 .
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(5.1) For d1 ≤ 25 and d2 ≥ 13 we have d1 ≥ 13 , 13 ≥ d3 ≥ 15 and
∥∥b34 − d∥∥1 = 23 − 2d3 < 25 .
(5.2) For d1 ≤ 25 and d2 ≤ 13 we have d1 ≥ 13 and
∥∥b34 − d∥∥1 = 2d1 − 23 < 25 .
For d3 = 15 , see (4.1), we can assume d1 = d2 =
2
5 due to (4.2) and can apply (5.1). It remains to check,
whether
∥∥b3i − d∥∥1 = 25 for the stated subspaces. This is easily verified. 
For n = 4 voters the achievable power distributions for the Shapley-Shubik index up to symmetry are s41 =
(1, 0, 0, 0), s42 =
(
3
4 ,
1
12 ,
1
12 ,
1
12
)
, s43 =
(
2
3 ,
1
6 ,
1
6 , 0
)
, s44 =
(
7
12 ,
1
4 ,
1
12 ,
1
12
)
, s45 =
(
1
2 ,
1
2 , 0, 0
)
, s46 =
(
1
2 ,
1
6 ,
1
6 ,
1
6
)
,
s47 =
(
5
12 ,
5
12 ,
1
12 ,
1
12
)
, s48 =
(
5
12 ,
1
4 ,
1
4 ,
1
12
)
, s49 =
(
1
3 ,
1
3 ,
1
3 , 0
)
, s410 =
(
1
3 ,
1
3 ,
1
6 ,
1
6
)
, and s411 =
(
1
4 ,
1
4 ,
1
4 ,
1
4
)
.
For the Banzhaf power index and 4 voters the achievable power distributions up to symmetry are b41 = (1, 0, 0, 0),
b42 =
(
7
10 ,
1
10 ,
1
10 ,
1
10
)
, b43 =
(
3
5 ,
1
5 ,
1
5 , 0
)
, b44 =
(
1
2 ,
1
2 , 0, 0
)
, b45 =
(
1
2 ,
3
10 ,
1
10 ,
1
10
)
, b46 =
(
1
2 ,
1
6 ,
1
6 ,
1
6
)
, b47 =(
5
12 ,
1
4 ,
1
4 ,
1
12
)
, b48 =
(
2
5 ,
1
5 ,
1
5 ,
1
5
)
, b49 =
(
3
8 ,
3
8 ,
1
8 ,
1
8
)
, b410 =
(
1
3 ,
1
3 ,
1
3 , 0
)
, b411 =
(
1
3 ,
1
3 ,
1
6 ,
1
6
)
, and b412 =
(
1
4 ,
1
4 ,
1
4 ,
1
4
)
.
Lemma 5. For n = 4 the regions where min
χ
‖d− BZ(χ)‖1 = 25 are given by d1 = 45 , d2 = 15 and d1 = 34 ,
d2 =
1
4 .
Proof. (1) For d1 ≥ 45 we have
∥∥b41 − d∥∥1 = 2 − 2d1 ≤ 25 , where equality is attained iff d1 = 45 . If d1 = 45
and d2 ≤ 110 then we have d4 ≤ d3 ≤ 110 and
∥∥b42 − d∥∥1 = 15 < 25 . If we have d1 = 45 and d2 ≥ 110 then
we have d2 ≤ 15 , d4 ≤ d3 ≤ 110 , and
∥∥b42 − d∥∥1 = 2d2 ≤ 25 , where equality is attained iff d2 = 15 and
d3 = d4 = 0.
(2.1) For 35 ≤ d1 ≤ 45 and d2 ≥ 15 we have
∥∥b43 − d∥∥1 = 25 − 2d3 ≤ 25 , where equality is attained iff
d3 = d4 = 0. So here we can proceed as in the proof of Lemma 2 to deduce min
χ
‖d− BZ(χ)‖1 < 25 for
d1 6= 34 .
(2.2) For 35 ≤ d1 ≤ 45 , d2 ≤ 15 , and d1 + d4 ≤ 45 we have
∥∥b43 − d∥∥1 = 2d1 + 2d4 − 65 ≤ 25 , where equality is
attained iff d1 + d4 = 45 .
(2.3) For 35 ≤ d1 ≤ 45 , d2 ≤ 15 , and d1 + d4 ≥ 45 we have d4 ≤ 110 , d1 ≥ 710 , and
∥∥b42 − d∥∥1 ≤ 25 , where
equality is only possible for d4 = 0 so that (2.2) yields d1 = 45 and we can apply (1).
(3.1) For 12 ≤ d1 ≤ 35 and d2 ≥ 310 we have d2 ≤ 12 and
∥∥b44 − d∥∥1 = 1− 2d2 ≤ 25 , where equality is attained
iff d2 = 310 . For
1
2 ≤ d1 ≤ 35 and d2 = 310 we have d3 + d4 ≤ 15 , d4 ≤ 110 , and
∥∥b43 − d∥∥1 = 15 +2d4 ≤ 25
where equality is attained iff d3 = d4 = 110 and d1 =
1
2 . But in the latter case we have
∥∥b45 − d∥∥1 = 0.
(3.2) For 12 ≤ d1 ≤ 35 , 15 ≤ d2 ≤ 310 , and d3 ≤ 15 we have d3+d4 = 1−d1−d2 ≥ 710−d1 so that d3 ≥ 720− d12
holds. Thus we have
∥∥b43 − d∥∥1 = 85 − 2d1 − 2d3 ≤ 910 − d1 ≤ 25 , where equality is attained iff d1 = 12 ,
d2 =
3
10 , d3 = d4 =
1
10 , which equals b
4
5.
(3.3) For 12 ≤ d1 ≤ 35 and d3 ≥ 15 we have d2 ≥ 15 and
∥∥b43 − d∥∥1 = 65 − 2d1 < 25 .
(3.4) For 12 ≤ d1 ≤ 35 and d2 ≤ 15 we have d3 ≤ 15 and
∥∥b43 − d∥∥1 = 2d4 < 25 since d4 ≤ 1−d13 ≤ 16 .
(4.1) For d1 ≤ 12 and d3 + d4 ≤ 15 we have d2 ≤ 12 and
∥∥b44 − d∥∥1 = 2d3 +2d4 ≤ 25 , where equality is attained
iff d3 + d4 = 15 . For the latter case see (4.7).
(4.2) For 25 ≤ d1 ≤ 12 and d3 ≥ 15 we have d2 ≥ 15 and
∥∥b43 − d∥∥1 = 65 − 2d1 ≤ 25 , where equality is attained
iff d1 = 25 . For the latter case see (5.1)-(5.4).
(4.3) For d1 ≤ 12 , d2 ≤ 1130 , and d3 ≤ 16 we have d2 ≥ 16 , d4 ≤ 16 , and
∥∥b46 − d∥∥1 = 2d2 − 13 ≤ 25 , where
equality is attained iff d2 = 1130 . In the latter case we consider x =
∥∥b45 − d∥∥1. For d4 ≤ d3 ≤ 110 we
have x = 215 <
2
5 and for d3 ≥ d4 ≥ 110 we have x = 2d3 + 2d4 − 415 ≤ 25 , where equality is attained
iff d3 + d4 = 13 , i. e. d3 = d4 =
1
6 , and
∥∥b411 − d∥∥1 < 25 . Finally, for d3 ≥ 110 and d4 ≤ 110 we have
x = 2d3 − 115 < 25 .
(4.4) For 25 ≤ d1 ≤ 12 and d4 ≥ 16 we have d2 ≥ d3 ≥ 16 and
∥∥b46 − d∥∥1 = 1− 2d1 < 25 .
(4.5) For 25 ≤ d1 ≤ 12 , d2 ≥ 15 , d3 ≤ 15 , and d3+d4 ≥ 15 we have d4 ≤ 15 and
∥∥b48 − d∥∥1 = 45 −2d3−2d4 ≤ 25 ,
where equality is attained iff d3 + d4 = 15 . For the latter case see (4.7).
(4.6) For 25 ≤ d1 ≤ 12 and d2 ≤ 15 we have d4 ≤ d3 ≤ 15 and
∥∥b48 − d∥∥1 = 2d1 − 45 < 25 .
(4.7) For 25 ≤ d1 ≤ 12 and d3 + d4 = 15 we have d2 ≥ 310 , d3 ≥ 110 , d4 ≤ 110 , d2 + d3 ≤ 1 − d1 ≤ 35 and∥∥b45 − d∥∥1 = 2d2+2d3− 45 ≤ 25 , where equality is attained iff d2+d3 = 35 , i. e. d1 = 25 , d2 = 25 , d3 = 15 ,
and d4 = 0. In the latter case we have
∥∥b410 − d∥∥1 < 25 .
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(5.1) For d1 ≤ 25 , d2 ≥ 13 , and d3 ≤ 310 we have d1 ≥ 13 , d2 ≤ 25 , d4 ≤ 16 and
∥∥b49 − d∥∥1 = ∣∣d1 − 38 ∣∣ +∣∣d2 − 38 ∣∣+ ∣∣d3 − 18 ∣∣+ ∣∣d4 − 18 ∣∣ ≤ 124 + 124 + 740 + 18 < 25 .
(5.2) For d1 ≤ 25 , d2 ≥ 13 , and d3 ≥ 310 we have d1 ≥ 13 , d3 ≤ 13 , and
∥∥b410 − d∥∥1 = 23 − 2d3 < 25 .
(5.3) For d1 ≤ 25 , d2 ≤ 13 , and d4 < 215 we have d1 > 1345 . For d1 ≥ 13 we have
∥∥b410 − d∥∥1 = 2d1+2d4− 23 < 25
and for d1 < 13 we have
∥∥b410 − d∥∥1 = 2d4 < 25 .
(5.4) For 724 ≤ d1 ≤ 25 , d2 ≤ 13 , and d4 ≥ 215 we have d2 ≥ 15 and consider x =
∥∥b411 − d∥∥1. If d3 ≥ d4 ≥ 16
then we have x = 23 − 2d2 < 25 for d1 ≥ 13 and x = 43 − 2d1 − 2d2 < 25 . If d4 ≤ d3 ≤ 16 then
we have x = 2d1 − 23 < 25 for d1 ≥ 13 and x = 0 for d1 ≤ 13 . If d3 ≥ 16 and d4 ≤ 16 then we have
x = 2d1 + 2d3 − 1 < 25 for d1 ≥ 13 and x = 2d3 − 13 for d1 ≤ 13 .
(6) For 14 ≤ d1 ≤ 724 we have d3 ≤ d2 ≤ 724 , d4 = 1− d1 − d2 − d3 ≥ 1 18 and we consider x =
∥∥b412 − d∥∥1.
For d4 ≤ d3 ≤ d2 ≤ 14 we have x = 2d1 − 12 < 25 , for d2 ≥ 14 and d4 ≤ d3 ≤ 14 we have x =
2d1 + 2d2 − 1 < 25 , and for d2 ≥ d3 ≥ 14 and d4 ≤ 14 we have x = 12 − 2d4 < 25 .
Finally we have to show that min
χ
‖d− BZ(χ)‖1 = 25 for the stated regions. For d1 = 0.75, d2 = 0.25 we have
done this already by solving an ILP. Now let d1 = 45 and d2 =
1
5 . We can easily check
∥∥d− BZ (b4i )∥∥1 >= 25 for
all 1 ≤ i ≤ 12 and ∥∥d− BZ (b41)∥∥1 = 25 . 
We would like to remark that the weighted voting game χ = [5; 4, 1, 1, 1, 1] has
(
15
19 ,
1
19 ,
1
19 ,
1
19 ,
1
19
)
as its
Banzhaf vector and fulfills ‖(0.8, 0.2, 0, 0, 0)− BZ(χ)‖1 < 13 . So the desired power distribution (0.8, 0.2, 0, 0, 0)
is not an example for worst possible approximation property. So maybe for n ≥ 5 the desired power distribution
(0.75, 0.25, 0, 0, 0) is the unique example with worst possible approximation property for the Banzhaf power index.
We remark ‖(0.75, 0.25, 0, 0, 0)− BZ(χ)‖1 = 3076 ≈ 0.3947368.
As far as the Shapley Shubik power index is concerned we have no idea if (0.75, 0.25, 0, . . . ) is the unique
example with worst possible approximation property for large n or if there are regions which are hard to approxi-
mate. In principle we can utilize our ILP formulation from Section 4 to check whether a whole region like d1 = 56 ,
1
12 ≤ d2 ≤ 16 can not be approximated with an error less than 13 by letting the di variables with certain range
bounds instead of numerical constants. As an example we have tried this for n = 6 and obtained the weighted
voting game χ = [5; 5, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1] approximating the desired power distribution d =
(
5
6 ,
1
12 ,
1
12 , 0, 0, 0
)
with an
error of ‖d− SS(χ)‖1 = 15 < 13 .
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